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Abstract 
This article describes the establishment of a new local governance arrangement called ‘Green 
Service’ in the Netherlands. Under this programme, farmers are financially rewarded - by both 
public and private bodies - for their nature and landscape management and development 
activities. Despite a general positive stance, it has taken considerable efforts and time for these 
programmes to take off, in particular due to uncertainties and discussions on whether these 
activities would be feasible under the EU state aid regime. The multi level setting in which these 
rules had to be complied with contributed much to the long lasting discussion on how to interpret 
these rules and threatened the credibility of this new governance arrangement. We will describe 
and explain this process by using a so-called ‘processual institutional’ approach and more 
specifically by drawing on the socio-cognitive literature on conflict escalation (Pruitt and Rubin 
1986; Rubin, Pruitt et al. 1994). 
 
1. Green Services: a short genealogy of a new governance arrangement 
From the 1970s onwards both nature conservation and spatial policies in the Netherlands have 
focussed on the preservation of the country side. National policies not only targeted the threats of 
a further expansion of the urban area but also devoted specific attention to spatial and 
environmental impacts of the on-going rationalisation in agriculture (Frouws 1998, p.54). The 
increased pressure on the country side due to the modernisation and intensification of the 
agricultural sector called for regulatory measures to preserve the rural areas (Eshuis 2006, p.6). To 
integrate these agricultural practices with nature conservation, landscape management and 
recreational demands various agro-environmental programmes have been established. In fact, the 
government introduced a number of subsidies, based on a compensation principle for suboptimal 
external production circumstances (i.e. the loss of revenues and additional labour costs), when 
farmers were ready to take the traditional characteristics of the country side into account.  
After an initial hesitance and even distrust of farmers to join these schemes, farmers have become 
more enthusiastic to participate since the mid 1990s (RLG 2002, p. 22-4). Various authors (De 
                                                 
1
 Pieter Zwaan is junior researcher of the Department of Public Administration and Policy, 
Wageningen University and Research Center; contact by e-mail: Pieter.Zwaan@wur.nl; Henri Goverde 
is Endowed Professor Political Science, Wageningen University and Research Center, and Reader 
Public Administration, Radboud University Nijmegen, contact by e-mail: h.goverde@fm.ru.nl 
 2 
Bruijn 1995, Renting et al 1994, Glasbergen 2000 in Eshuis 2006, pp.6-7) attribute credits for this 
change in attitude among farmers to the so-called ‘agricultural nature associations’ that have been 
established since the beginning of the 1990s in the Netherlands.  
These national schemes however, which consisted of a largely fixed set of measures, were 
increasingly experiences as inflexible and unattractive because of its bureaucratic implementation, 
the small allowances and the limited possibilities to appropriate these schemes in a ‘territory-
based’ way. These national schemes were largely based on ‘first come, first served’ principle 
which meant that it depended on the farmers which measures were taken in a specific territory. 
Governmental actors could give this limited direction.  
Both local and regional (governmental) actors and farmers wanted to move away from the rigid 
subsidy schemes that have been developed by the national government and to allow for more 
bottom-up initiatives in which actors in the field themselves can decide on how much they want to 
pay for what measures. Instead of working with a fixed set of measures, it had to become possible 
to set up ‘custom-made contracts’ with individual farmers or other ‘rural entrepreneurs’. In 
addition, it was proposed that not only public authorities, but also non-profit organisations or 
private parties should be able to pay farmers, via private business contracts, for their nature 
management and development activities (RLG 2002, p. 19). The call for more autonomy and self-
regulation at the local level, was recognized and elaborated by the national government at the 
beginning of the new millennium. The call for more public space and participation of private 
actors and market oriented locally based initiatives fitted well in the neo-liberal policy of the 
government concerning the agricultural sector (Van Duinhoven 2002). Over the recent years, the 
rural country site has been recognised in various governmental documents as an attractive 
consumption space that could broaden farmers’ economic activities and increase their income 
(MNP 2002, Ministry of ANF 2004, Ministry of Housing 2001, 2006).  
 
The recognition of these changes was marked by the introduction of the concept of ‘Green 
Services’ (GS)2 in the national Structure-scheme on the Green Environment (2002)3 and an advice 
on this concept by the Council of the Rural Area4 in 2002. The concept of GS answered to these 
changes in various way and in important way reframed the role of farmers in the rural area. The 
concept GS clearly moves away from perceiving the demand for landscape and nature as a bad 
external conditions for agricultural production, which should be compensated by governmental 
subsidies. Instead of that, the concept of GS aimed to appreciate the measures taken by farmers as 
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a commodity desired by society that should be rewarded (by both private as governmental bodies) 
with a market related price (RLG 2002).  
 
Related to the introduction of the concept of GS, numerous initiatives have been developed over 
the recent years mainly by local and provincial governments and on occasions together with local 
non governmental actors. In 2006 over 40 initiatives were elaborated (Van Moorsel and Dijkman 
2007). A number of these initiatives, including the initiative that will be described in this article, 
were (financially) supported in an early stage by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality (ANF). With an eye on the forthcoming discussion on a new European Regulation on 
support for rural development - which provides the framework for European co-financing of rural 
development and the requirements for state aid to farmers (Tweede Kamer 13 Oktober 2005) - for 
the period 2007-2013, the minister of ANF wanted to further develop and explore the concept of 
GS though a number of pilot projects, called Explorations Green Services (Tweede Kamer 7 juli 
2003; Gedeputeerde Staten van Gelderland 18 februari 2004; Tweede Kamer 2004)  
At the same time, around 2003, a lobby had started for the concept of GS aimed at the European 
Commission (EC), to create more possibilities within the European Regulation to develop and 
carry out these GS. The EC though, early on stated that market related payments to farmers would 
not be allowed. Farmers could only be rewarded on the basis of the state aid requirements that 
were already in place, which meant that theses payments had be based, like in the existing 
schemes, on the loss of revenues and additional labour costs. These state aid requirements could 
not be changed, according to the EC, because of WTO agreements (Tweede Kamer 13 Oktober 
2005, Interview 7 July 2008). 
 
To be absolutely sure that the pilot projects in the ‘Exploration’ indeed would meet these EU state 
aid requirements the Ministry of ANF required that these project were notified to and approved by 
the European Commission (MNP 2002). Only under these conditions, the pilot projects would get 
financial support.  
The suggestion that the concept of GS would be subject to the EU state aid regime, or at least that 
the payments had to be based on a loss of revenues and additional labour costs, was not accepted 
by all local and regional actors that were involved in these pilot project. In the case that we will 
describe in this paper the application of these state aid rule was in fact heavily contested. Local 
and regional actors argued that GS could be  organized in such a way that the EU state aid rules 
would not apply and that it would be possible to pay farmers market based prices. The Ministry 
though, held on to their position that the EU state aid requirements prohibited the national 
authorities to provide financial support for GS irrespective of the juridical construction on which 
these GS would be based.  
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The application of these EU state aid requirements thereby produced much ambiguity and 
discussion and led even to an eventual stalemate on how to interpret these rules. The discussion on 
how to interpret these rules led to a considerable delay and threatened the credibility and trust 
local actors in this projects, including the farmer on which the success of these GS would depend. 
Where local and regional actors hoped to conclude the first GS contracts with farmers halfway 
2004 it lasted until the beginning of 2007 before they could start working with these GS.      
 
The case-study below will focus on what caused this delay and will describe how actors negotiated 
on how to interpret these EU requirements. It will describe how actors created this stalemate as 
well as how actors found a social practice that could save the credibility for these GS projects in 
the local communities. The case will be described in paragraph 4. This rather (extreme) case will 
be described and explained by using a so-called ‘processual institutional’ approach and more 
specifically by drawing on the socio-cognitive literature on conflict escalation (Pruitt and Rubin 
1986; Rubin, Pruitt et al. 1994). We will set out this approach in the next paragraph 2. In 
paragraph 5 we will draw some conclusions and reflect on the impact of a multi level setting on 
the establishment of a new local governance arrangement.  
 
2. Making sense of EU requirements: an ‘institutional processual perspective’ 
The theoretical framework developed here moves away from perceiving the EU state-aid 
requirements (and formal legislation in general) as exogenous and autonomous forces that affected 
the establishment of these new governance arrangements. As the effect of these formal EU 
requirements in the end ‘lies (…) in the practice’ with these rules (Taylor 1993, 58), we will 
outline an argument in which law is perceived as gaining its ‘meaning through its interpretation 
and its implementation’ (Edelman, 2004).  
 
To understand and explain how actors made sense of and responded to these formal rule we will 
draw on both the sociological institutional literature (e.g. Powell and DiMaggio 1991; March and 
Olsen 1989) as the ‘processual’ social-cognitive literature on sensemaking (e.g. Weick 1995). We 
belief that both these approaches provide interesting and largely complementary insights with 
regards to how actor interpret these formal rules (cf. Coburn 2001; Devereaux Jennings and 
Greenwood 2003). Recently a combination of these two perspectives has been referred to as an 
‘institutional processual’ approach (Barzelay 2004; Barzelay and Gallego 2006).5  
 
Sociological institutional theory emphasizes that actors often fall back on existing scripts to 
understand the world and to ‘find out’ how to behave. Previous experiences, existing routines, 
norms and social-cognitive scripts, all provide the ‘frames of meaning’ that guide human action 
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(Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). In order to find out how to behave in certain situation, actors will 
turn to what they know or to what they consider and have experienced as successful (Scott 1995: 
45, Black 1997: 60). Certain scripts moreover can become so evident or taken-for-granted that 
actors  may simply see them as ‘facts’ and feel no need to ‘go behind them’ (March and Olsen 
2004: 7; Termeer and Kessener 2007: 3). When it comes to the interpretation of formal rules and 
requirements, the SI perspective provides an interesting insight by drawing our attention to the 
idea that actor ‘must find a way of recognizing [these formal rules] as well as of responding to it, 
and [that] the scripts or templates implicit in the institutional world provide the means for 
accomplishing both of these tasks’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 948). 
 
Where institutional theory emphasizes the role of routinized behaviour and the role of existing 
(normative and cognitive) frames, sensemaking literature is concerned with those situations in 
which it is difficult to interpret our environment. The application of these formal rules on a 
particular activity can be the cause of this (uncertainty), but this equivocality may also stem from a 
confrontation with other actors’ interpretations of these formal rules (ambiguity) (Weick 1995).  
When this equivocality makes it impossible for actors to act, the sensemaking literature argues, 
actors they will attempt to reduce this ambiguity by ‘seeking out’ each others’ interpretations and 
guesses. Actors will argue and discuss which meaning should be selected and retained to make 
sense of this situation (Drazin et alii 1999; Scott 2001: 169). Actors’ interpretations, in a 
sensemaking perspective need to be (inter)actively connected to these equivocal situations (Weick 
1995:132, 2003: 188, Allard-Poesi 2005). 
 
Obviously the interaction between actors does not take place in a vacuum and it will make a 
difference who has control over specific resources, knowledge and expertise, procedures, as well 
as what status, reputation or access to ‘the arena’ actors have (Weick 1995; Coburn 2001; Weick 
et al, 2005). The positive or negative power of some actors will affect which meaning actors will 
and can give to these rules, even to point that some actors will try to impose their interpretation of 
these formal rules as a new  rule or requirement by itself.   
At the same time, it is good to realize that ‘power is above all a relational effect [and] not a 
property that can be held by someone or something’ (Clegg et allii 2006: 223). It is in the moment 
of sensemaking that actors will (re)construct and experience this power configuration. Not only 
these formal rules, but also the interactions and relations between actors (Dewulf et al. 
forthcoming) need to be either interpreted based on actors previous experiences and existing 
frames, or (re/de)constructed in this process (Bogason 2000; Marshall and Rollinson 2004; 
Bergman 2005; Clegg 2006). The social context or setting can be treated as given but as well be 
more explicitly confirmed or contested by actors.  
In addition, it needs to be remarked that the meanings that actors will attribute to these formal 
rules and the social context or setting will mutually and reciprocally affect each other (Termeer 
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1993). The meanings that actors attribute the social (relational and interactional) context may not 
only affect the meaning of these formal rules but turned round, the meanings that actors attribute 
to these formal rules may also affect how actors will interact and make sense of their relationship 
and interaction. Actors with similar interpretation for example, are likely to contact each other 
(Kessener and Termeer 2007). 
  
Escalation 
The way these different meanings affect each other can under certain conditions be read or 
described as a recurring pattern or mechanism (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001). Examples of such 
mechanisms which are often mentioned in relation to the compliance of formal rules or other 
norms are the mechanism of socialization or conformity. For describing this case study and for 
explaining the process in which actors negotiated and discussed the meaning of these EU state aid 
requirements we turn in this paper to the mechanism of escalation.    
 
When actors’ interpretations of these formal rules allow them to act according to their preferences 
and their ideas of appropriate behavior, or take these for granted, they are likely to hold on to their 
interpretation. Confronted with other interpretations actors will feel less inclined to change their 
interpretations and accept that of others, especially when these other interpretations do not fit their 
action logic and/or are experienced as  inconsistent or irrelevant (Weick 1995: 61; Checkel 2001).  
In fact, when another actor’s interpretation slows the accomplishment of an activity, this may 
cause actors to commit themselves to their interpretation and encourages them to persuade the 
other rather then accept or adapt to their interpretation (Weick 1995, 161; cf. Termeer 1993, 250).  
When actors fail to persuade the other into one’s own position, the discussion, because of actor’s 
commitment, may turn slowly into a heavier debate, absorbing time and attention and possible 
new actors (Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 64-65) (Brett, Shapiro et al. 1998, 411).6 Actor may turn to 
more assertive and aggressive tactics, such as attributing confusion or casting doubts, or by 
challenging the legitimacy of the other (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; Abolafia 2004: 432). These 
strategies moreover may be followed by demands, complaints and angry statements or by 
involving other third parties. A negative spiral of intensifying hostility may be set in motion, in 
which each reaction is more harsh than the action it follows (Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 90) or in 
which, when the other actors does not react, actors resort to more harsh tactics to be heard. 
 
Most of the time, particular norms may limit the use of harsh tactics. These conflict limiting norms 
though, may only be effective with actors that are well socialized (Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 67). 
When other actor’s interpretation and interests seem opposed to one’s own (Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 
69) and actors find it hard to accept or comprehend this however, these social bond comes under 
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pressure (Rubin et al. 1994, 130). Actors may change their perception and attitudes towards the 
other, whereby the other gets seen as less moral or legitimate or even untrustworthy (Pruitt and 
Rubin 1986, 99), which in turn may result in not giving the other the benefit of the doubt, 
perceiving their actions as threatening, or thinking in ‘zero-sum’ terms (Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 
100-4). Finding a common position on how to interpret these formal rule may under these 
conditions and fixations be more difficult then ever and it likely that this escalation process will 
only come to an end by a stalemate when neither party is able or willing to escalate any further 
(Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 127).  
 
Under these circumstances (that of a stalemate) actors will come to realise that they cannot 
persuade or force the other to adopt their interpretation and that they somehow need to find a 
common solution. A so-called ‘integrative solution’ under these conditions, may be a way out of 
this stalemate (Rubin et al. 1994, 173). An example of such a solution is that of logrolling. This is 
a solution in which each party concedes on issues that are of low priority to itself and high priority 
to the other party. A bridging solution is a different integrative solution whereby actors search at a 
different level for a solution. The discussion turns away from this interpretation of the rules to the 
interests or norm that underlie this interpretation, and whether actors can find a more instrumental 
'solution' for this (Pruitt & Rubin 1986). A solution in both these cases is different from a simple 
compromise that results from an averaging of the initial position and can come closer to both 
actors positions. (Allard-Poesi 1998, 403).  
 
3. Research strategy 
The case study can be qualified as an ‘extreme’ case in relation to the EU state aid regime. The 
idea of Green Service as a market based concept that moves away from the traditional way of 
subsidizing framers appears to be most advocated in the initiative that we will describe here. More 
then in the other projects that were concerned with establishing these GS, there were strong 
differences of opinions among actors on how to interpret the EU state aid requirements.  
 
This single case study is analysed by using the method of process-tracing (George and Bennett 
2005). In first instance we have chronologically reconstructed what happened when and where and 
how these events affected each other. To do so we used a strategy of ‘process mapping’ by which 
we first, for analytical purposes, graphically depicted the various processes that occurred 
simultaneously and parallel to each other at different levels. Not all these processes will be 
discussed in this paper. We will largely confine our self to the interaction between local and 
regional actors and the Ministry of ANF and their discussion on how to interpretation of these 
state aid requirements. We belief that this interaction process has been most crucial for explaining 
the thorny establishment of the new policy arrangement of GS.  
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The trajectory that we will describe will starts at the moment the first ideas on these concept of GS 
were aired and will be concluded shortly after the ‘implementation’ of these GS in the field. The 
processes that took place between different actors and at different levels will be largely treated as 
inputs to this process (cf. Hill and Hupe 2003). For matters of time and space these processes are 
less extensively discussed in this paper.7 
 
The process is ‘reconstructed’ by triangulating data that was gathered through document analysis, 
secondary analysis and by doing semi-structured interviews with key actors at all governmental 
levels8 (Flick 2005: 179). In the first place we interviewed actors who stood at the basis of this 
initiative at the local level. We used a snowball technique (on the basis of these interviews and 
document analysis) to select other involved actors. To get the best idea of how these local actors 
and initiators experienced the impact of these rules on these new governance arrangement, we 
believed this was the best way to proceed.  
Various types of documents contained in the archives of the various governmental bodies have 
been analysed, which included amongst others, minutes of meetings and formal and informal 
correspondence. Besides the publicly accessible parliamentary documents, the analysis of the 
minutes consisted of internal memos, project notes, policy documents, formal correspondence, etc. 
that have been made accessible to one of the authors by key actors in this process. Document of 
the European Commission could not be consulted. Next to that, one of the authors participates as 
an actor in this process 9.  
 
4. Green Services Ooijpolder-Groesbeek 
The area ‘Ooijpolder-Groesbeek’ is situated south of the river Waal (Rhein) between Nijmegen 
and the Dutch-German border (see map) in the province Gelderland. In formal terms three Dutch 
municipalities are involved: Ubbergen, Millingen aan de Rijn, and Groesbeek In physical 
geographic respect, this municipal territory has two main characteristics: it is a polder area 
occupied by farms, villages, landscapes of dykes and nature as well as a hilly part (a kame terrace 
result of an ice contact feature) with arable land, meadows, forests, and residential settlements. 
This municipal territory is also part of a so-called ‘national landscape’, called ‘the Gelderse 
Poort’, a vital policy category introduced by the national authorities.  
 
It is important to notice that the national spatial planning authorities decided already in 1972 that 
the quality as an open space of this rural area should be protected against large scale extensions for 
housing or industry by the city of Nijmegen. Some years later, this decision was contested by a 
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proposal of the Ministry of Traffic and Water Management that offered a more straight riverbed 
(Lobith – Nijmegen) through the polder in order to support rational-economic bulk-cargo shipping 
from Rotterdam to Germany, France and Switzerland. However, social political movements, 
locally and nationally, resisted this plan effectively. The ‘Ooijpolder’ was reconfirmed as an area 
for agriculture as well as for nature and landscape. However, this confirmed spatial status of the 
polder area became under attack after two shock events of very high river floods in 1993 and 
1995. Then, the Ministry of Traffic and Water Management destined a great part of this area as a 
retention basin in case of unavoidable river floods. According to a people’s movement, however, 
the authorities used incomplete information concerning water supply in the future as well as they 
argued lacking much relevant knowledge concerning assumptions in water management used by 
the German authorities.  
 
 
Map: The city of Nijmegen with the area Ooijpolder-Groesbeek  
 
At the beginning of the millennium various local non-governmental actors in this area had taken  
the initiative to set up a programme that would involve farmers in the maintenance and 
development of the country-side and would reward them for these activities by market based price. 
The extra income would enable farmers to continue farming which is a precondition to sustain the 
mixed landscape of cultural and natural grounds typical for this territory (Provincie Gelderland 
December 2003). In 2001 this initiative was incorporated as a so-called ‘experimental garden’ 
project in a pilot of the Ministry of ANF. This pilot aimed to give an impetus to the quality of the 
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rural area by stimulating bottom-up initiatives. On behalf of the Ministry of ANF, the Province of 
Gelderland took responsibility for this ‘experimental garden’ at the regional level, but also the 
municipalities in the area became more involved in this project (we will refer to them as ‘the local 
actors’). Given its fit with the concept of GS, the project was, when the ‘experimental garden’ 
pilot was cancelled due too financial cut backs, included in the above mentioned pilot project 
‘Exploration Green Services’ of the Ministry of ANF.   
In this context the three municipalities in the area produced a common landscape development 
plan (LDP) that anticipated on various development in the country side and had to give direction 
to these GS. Besides preserving the agrarian production function in the area the plan provided also 
a new perspective for coping with a number of recreational developments. The LDP includes circa 
ninety preferable rather detailed project proposals, though it does not exclude in advance new 
ideas that might come up during the implementation process in fit the plan; the LDP will be used 
in a flexible way (Gemeenten Groesbeek, Millingen a/d Rijn et al. 2004). Beside long term 
management and conservation projects, i.e. the GS, the projects in the LDP also consisted of one 
time investments projects, such as the removal of hiking barriers. In July 2004 the LDP was 
official approved by the councils of the different municipalities.   
 
A new financial judicial regime 
During the policy-making process of the LDP it became clear that a new financial judicial regime 
had to be elaborated that could support the realization of especially the GS projects but would not 
be interpreted as a subsidy to particular firms and hence, produce a conflict with EU state aid 
requirements. When the payments of these projects would be subject to the EU state aid 
requirements, this would set restrictions on the height of the payment and the length of the 
contracts (this would be six years10). Payments then would have be based on the loss of revenues 
and additional labour costs, while actors in the field wanted to value these activities positively and 
offer a market based price. Moreover, actors wanted to avoid the uncertain and time-consuming 
EU state aid notification process that would become necessary when these project would fall 
under the state aid requirements (Interview 11 June 2008 (a)). If one wanted to use the plan in a 
flexible way and allow for changes and adjustments, it would become necessary to notify any new 
GS project to the Commission at the moment that a farmer would be willing to participate.  
 
In order to create a financial-juridical construction that would not be subject to the EU state aid 
regime, the three municipalities invited an independent consultancy office to prepare an advice 
(KPMG 2004). Based on its understanding of the EU state aid requirements the consultancy office 
advised to found an independent ‘landscape fund’ that could enhance these GS, as ‘services of 
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general interests’ based on accountable and market inspired (and priced) business contracts. The 
landscape fund would be ‘filled’ with both public and private money. Governmental contributions 
were considered to be of importance especially at the start of the fund to cover overhead costs and 
to create a financial multiplier. Financial support by governmental bodies, could increase the 
acceptance and trust of private actors in the landscape fund and motivate them to contribute as 
well  (ibid, pp. 4-5). 
To make absolutely sure that these payments would not be qualified as state aid, it was suggested 
to separate the agrarian function of their land from an additional recreational or natural function 
on which the landscape fund could place natural and landscape elements. By separating these 
functions it would become possible to by-pass the EU state aid requirements for farmers as they 
would not carry out any agrarian activities on this land. Via a 'building and planting right' the 
elements that would be place on this land could remain the property of the landscape fund and 
by consequently vesting a so-called 'servitude', the landscape fund could oblige the farmer to 
allow certain activities on his land, such as the recreation of others, or oblige him to undertake 
certain activities himself, such as maintaining these elements. By using this financial-judicial 
construction, farmers would not have an economic benefit (as farmers) and it would become 
possible to qualify these services as a ‘service in the general interest’ to which these state aid 
requirement would not be applicable (ibid, p.16, 40). 
 
The report of the consultancy agency, suggesting that this construction wasn’t a subsidy 
arrangement, could not convince all governmental actors. The Ministry of ANF, on which the 
project depended for its financial support (the project would receive two million euros) in 
particular, was not fully convinced of the conclusions of the report and stressed that the projects 
had to be notified to the Commission in order to receive any financial aid. The Ministry argued 
that the complex construction that was suggested by the consultancy office made it difficult to tell 
whether these GS projects would be possible within the European legal framework. According to 
the Ministry, the rapport only gave a direction for setting up these GS project in such a way that 
they would not qualify as state aid, but did it not explicitly checked these GS projects on the state 
aid requirements. The Ministry, which more in general doubted whether a financial construction 
that would involve farmers would not be subject to the EU state aid regime (see below), stressed 
that one could not conclude that a notification of these projects in ‘Brussels’ would not be 
necessary (Tweede Kamer 22 november 2004). 
 
Increasing contestation 
A notification in Brussels, as said, was felt as very unwelcome by those in the field. Taking into 
account these EU state aid requirements would not only imply all kinds of restrictions on the 
height of these payments and the period of the contract and thereby affect the willingness of 
farmers to participate, but would also mean that each GS contract with a farmer, would have to be 
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checked by ‘Brussels’. This would raise the transaction costs and create a lengthy period of 
uncertainty on whether these GS  project could carried out. The credibility of enlarging the scope 
of farming by GS could thereby become easy under pressure, while a notification in Brussels was, 
according to these local actors, unnecessary. 
  
The interpretation of the Ministry of ANF that these project had to be notified was therefore not 
straightforwardly accepted, all the more as local actors felt that the Ministry could not provide a 
good argument why this construction could not be possible. Instead of following the interpretation 
of the Ministry, they tried to convince the Ministry of their position. In order to do so, local and 
regional actors sought direct informal contact with DG Competition of the EC to find support for 
their stance that their construction was feasible under the EU state regime. Although DG 
Competition stressed that DG Agriculture and Rural Development (‘DG Agri’) has to decide on 
this, they stated this in principle should be possible (interview 19 April 2007). Supported by and 
through civil society organisations, a.o. World Wildlife Fund (WWF), a lobby was further 
organized directed at the Ministry stressing that these GS in the ‘Ooijpolder’ are ‘services of 
general interest’ and therefore not fall under the EU state aid regime.  
 
Where local actors used the statements of DG Competition and the advice of the consultancy 
office to look for leeway in these rules, the Ministry of ANF was much more careful. The Ministry 
played it safe as the Minister eventually will be held responsible by the Commission when these 
requirement are not met. The Ministry wanted to make sure that these project would be ‘Brussels-
proof’. Where local actors argued that these ‘service’ would not distort the functioning of the 
internal market, the Ministry of ANF argued that thing were not that simple (Ministerie van 
Landbouw Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit 2005, interview 21 March 2008). According to local actors, 
the Ministry was departing too much from the existing agri-environmental schemes that were 
notified to the Commission under the Regulations for rural development and they looked 
insufficiently for the leeway these European requirements offer. Local actors argued that the 
Ministry of ANF, assumed wrongly that ‘once a farmer is involved, these Green Service 
automatically qualify as state aid.’ (Provincie Gelderland 25 September 2004; Gedeputeerde 
Provincie Gelderland Keereweer 5 november 2004). The Ministry of ANF however, could not be 
persuaded to take a different look at these EU requirements; it was unreceptive to these arguments.   
 
Local actors though took a similar inflexible stance on how to interpret these rules (interview 19 
April 2007). Instead of following the Ministry they got more committed to their interpretation, 
partly as they felt not being taken seriously by the Ministry. (Ministerie van Landbouw Natuur en 
Voedselkwaliteit 2005; interview 21 March 2008; interview 26 June 2008). During the discussions 
with the Ministry local actors became suspicious of the Ministry of ANF and started to involve 
more parties in this process. Besides the different NGO’s that were mobilized to lobby for this 
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concept, also Members of Parliament became involved in this discussion. Initially Members of 
Parliament called for a more detailed argument by the Minister of ANF of why the construction 
that was proposed by the consultancy agency was not feasible (Tweede Kamer 22 november 
2004). Later on Members of Parliament asked more in general whether the GS project in the 
‘Ooijpolder’, could be qualified as ‘service of general interests’ (Tweede Kamer 26 april 2005).  
The suspicion also manifested itself in more direct contact with the Ministry of ANF. In direct e-
mails to senior officials, local actors complained in particular about the stance taken by the 
department of Judicial Affairs (Ministerie van Landbouw Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit 2005), but 
also in more formal correspondence the critique on the Ministry was made known (Gedeputeerde 
Provincie Gelderland Keereweer 5 november 2004; Gedeputeerde Staten van Gelderland 5 
oktober 2004). In an official letter, a member of the provincial executive of Gelderland called 
upon the Minister to ‘use his authority to let his civil servant follow the outlook of the independent 
jurist’ that were hired by the province, so one could start with the implementation of the LDP 
(Gedeputeerde Provincie Gelderland Keereweer 5 november 2004). The Minister rebounded the 
complaint and argued that the discussion on the application of the state aid requirements by the 
Province of Gelderland itself hampered the implementation of the LDP (De Minister van 
Landbouw 25 januari 2005).  
     
Going to ‘Brussels’ 
At the insistence of the Ministry of ANF, the province of Gelderland meanwhile had started with 
the official state aid notification procedure for the GS projects that were proposed in the LDP. 
While the province complied with the requirement of the Ministry to notify these project in 
Brussels, it insisted on its position, support by independent jurists, that these project were not 
subject to the EU state aid regime. The notification that was being prepared by the province 
concerned ‘a non-aid measure which is notified to the Commission for reasons of legal certainty’ 
(Provincie Gelderland 31 januari 2005).  
Being concerned about the continuity of implementing the GS projects of the LDP, the province of 
Gelderland took the initiative to organize a meeting with DG Agri and the Ministry of ANF to 
make clear which operational criteria the EU-Commission would use to decide on the GS projects 
in the ‘Ooijpolder’ (Gedeputeerde Staten van Gelderland 5 oktober 2004; Tweede Kamer 26 april 
2005). After some insistence of the province, a meeting with civil servants was organized by the 
Ministry of ANF in April 2005 (interview 19 April 2007). The province expected to have a good 
chance to convince the Commission that these state aid requirements would not apply to their 
initiative.  
Like the Ministry of ANF the Commission however, advised against a ‘non-aid notification’ to the 
Commission and made clear that payments had to be based on the loss of revenues and additional 
labour costs (Ministerie van Landbouw Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit 2005). These services could 
not be qualified as ‘services of general interest’ as farmers would benefit, no matter how much, 
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from these GS contracts (interview 11 June 2008(a)). In this specific case the Commission for 
example, wanted to know what would happen with the grass that would be ‘produced’ when 
farmers would mow their land as a GS for creating a hiking path. As soon as this grass would be 
used to feed their livestock this would qualify, according to the Commission, as a distortion of the 
internal market (interview 3 May 2007; interview 11 June 2008(b)).  
 
Local actors in the ‘Ooijpolder’ were shocked about the legalistic and rigid (in their eyes 
unrealistic) application of these state aid requirements (interview 19 April 2007). Notwithstanding 
this lack of understanding for the position taken by the Commission and a feeling that when the 
GS in the Ooijpolder were differently put to the fore by the Ministry of ANF this construction 
would have been possible (interview 19 April 2007), the discussion on the application of the state 
aid requirements was winded up.  
After the meeting with DG Agri the Ministry of ANF and the province made an agreement to 
jointly move ahead. The province would within short notice indicate which projects in the LDP 
would be subject to the state aid regime, so that these could be notified in Brussels before the 
Summer recess of 2005 (Ministerie van Landbouw Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit 2005). The 
Ministry of ANF would give a decisive answer on how these project had to be qualified and which 
of them would have to be notified in Brussels. As local actors now had to wait on a decision of the 
Commission, the province of Gelderland wanted to use the part of the finances that were reserved 
for the ‘Exploration’, for those projects that would not have to be notified (Gedeputeerde 
Provincie Gelderland Keereweer 26 oktober 2005).  
 
Catalogue Green Services 
The meeting in Brussels was also used to discuss in more general terms the relationship between 
these GS and the EU state aid notification procedure. Besides the initiative of GS Ooijpolder-
Groesbeek, various other projects had been launched by regional governmental bodies, as has been 
mentioned above. While the debate on GS Ooijpolder-Groesbeek was still on at the national level, 
already five schemes had been notified to the European Commission and this had caused severe 
difficulties. The novelty of these projects in combination with the accurate examination of the 
Commission had resulted in a substantial workload at the Commission’s desk-office, and in a 
lengthy and uncertain procedure for those that wanted to start with these projects. To overcome 
this hold-up the European Commission requested the Netherlands during this meeting to better 
organize the notification of these schemes and to work on a complete and definite overview of the 
services that the Netherlands wanted to implement (interview 3 May 2007; interview 11 June 2008 
(b); interview 26 June 2008).  
The Commissions’ suggestion was welcomed by the Netherlands, that saw a chance to deal with 
the long trajectory towards the European Commission, and on the initiative of the Ministry of 
ANF, the provinces were involved to develop this overview. GS was explicitly seen by the 
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Ministry as a provincial concept and in the light of a decentralization policy it was found desirable 
to involve the provinces in the development of this overview of GS (Tweede Kamer 13 Oktober 
2005, interview 21 March 2008, interview 26 June 2008). Timing was perfect as the provinces had 
recently organized themselves around the concept of GS and had set out their ambitions and 
expectations (Interview 26 June 2008).  
Instead of making a definite list on these Green Services, the provinces suggested to develop a 
‘catalogue’ that would consist of separate measures/services, together with a maximum price. The 
provinces suggested to create a flexible format based on which individual schemes could then be 
developed. These individual measures would be based on the different projects that had been 
developed over the recent years by the various provinces and other local actors (interview 3 May 
2007).  
 
The GS projects in the Ooijpolder would in first instance be excluded from the Catalogue. 
Involvement would mean a further delay for the implementation of the GS of the LDP and 
proceeding alone was preferred. The notification of the project and the contact with the Ministry 
of ANF went less prosperous then was hoped. The Ministry of ANF and Internal Affairs, which is 
officially responsible for the notification in Brussels, called several times for more detailed 
information on the GS projects that were mentioned in the LDP. The notification which they had 
hoped to round off before the summer, was delayed and joining the Catalogue was seen a more 
and more realistic option. Other provinces also put pressure on the province of Gelderland to 
include the GS projects of the Ooijpolder in the Catalogue (interview 26 June 2008) as they 
wanted to have a common position of the provinces on this catalogue (Keereweer 18 november 
2005). Even though those in the field still principally objected the application of the EU state aid 
regime and were hesitant to participate, it was realised that the establishment of the Catalogue 
offered the opportunity to make the EU requirements that must be met explicit and to act in a 
flexible manner to implement the LDP. The GS project of the LDP were eventually all included in 
the Catalogue. Though the Catalogue follows the state aid regime, the ‘Ooijpolder-Groesbeek’ 
polity accepted the Catalogue as modus vivendi to produce visible results in the area.  
Since the beginning of 2006 the provinces designed the catalogue in constant contact with the 
Commission. In February 2007 the Catalogue was approved (Commission 2007). 
 
Meanwhile financial resources had also been made available by the Ministry of ANF to implement 
those projects of the LDP that would not be subject to the EU state aid regime (De Minister van 
Landbouw 2 november 2005). Under the proviso that the Minister of ANF could retrieve his 
money, he was willing to made this money available. Despite these finances however, one could 
still not carry out the GS projects in the LDP as the Catalogue was not approved and the 
credibility of these GS remained under pressure. To ensure the credibility of these GS projects a 
member of the provincial executive therefore decided to support a number of GS projects that they 
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believed were not vulnerable for state aid procedures and to give financial support to these 
projects before approval of the Catalogue. The risk that these project would be subject to the EU 
state aid regime after all was weighed against the risk of losing confidence of local actors in the 
field in these GS projects (Gedeputeerde Staten van Gelderland 28 juni 2006). At the end of 2006 
the first GS projects were carried out on the basis of this financial support.   
  
The state aid requirement finally encouraged local actors to look for private financing possibilities 
for these GS. By making use of private money one could by-pass the state aid requirements all the 
way. In order to raise enough private money the trustees of the landscape fund Via Natura, 
together with a civil society organisation (ARK, non-profit specialists in landscape projects) and a 
private firm with expertise concerning organisational innovation in landscape and nature affairs 
(Triple E) organized an public sale in August 2007 in which the landscape elements were put up 
for auction to private participants. An often used slogan is that urban dwellers will get the 
opportunity to participate financially in the ‘green natural theatre’ around them. The ‘Prospectus 
Ooijpolder’ included circa 30 smaller and greater landscape elements to be maintained for a period 
of six till ten years with start bidding varying between € 500 and € 20000. The trustees of the 
landscape fund contracted individual bidders, civil society organisations, schools, private 
businesses, etcetera.11 On the basis of these private financial means most GS projects are financed. 
As they do not have to meet the state aid requirements these contracts can be signed for a period of 
10 years (interview 19 February 2008). 
 
5. Conclusions  
The case study demonstrates that making sense of these EU state aid requirement in a multi level 
setting is not always easy and can even be accompanied by contestation and conflict. Actors at 
different governmental levels attribute different meanings to these rules and have different reasons 
for holding on to these interpretations. The case study shows how actors at the national level were 
largely guided by their previous experiences and the responsibility of the Minister in case of a 
breach with EU law. Where the Ministry acted risk avoidant, local actors were eager to look for 
leeway that EU requirements in their eyes offered, encouraged by their principle stance that it 
should be possible to positively reward farmers for their landscape activities. They saw support for 
their position in the advice by independent jurists and consultants and the informal statements of 
DG Competition.  
 
Even though the Ministry of ANF was in a position to lay down their interpretation of these formal 
requirements as a requirement by itself through its control over financial means that local actors 
                                                 
11
 However, each participant had to pay the whole bid within four weeks after the auction. In other 
words, no yearly terms are accepted. Of course, the participants have benefits which will have different 
forms. For example, a yearly guided tour by the farmer, an information session about the total 
landscape plan, a pick-nick on the spot, a sponsor-record at the spot etcetera.    
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felt dependent on, local actor heavily contested this requirement. In stead of accepting the 
authority and expertise of the Ministry on how to interpret these rules, local actors mobilized their 
own expertise and tried to persuade the Ministry to adopt their interpretation of these rules. Their 
dependency on the Ministry did not caused them to accept their interpretation but committed them 
to trying to convince the Ministry (Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 71). Subsequent to a number of 
‘persuasive strategies’ such as the mobilization of expertise and selecting information that 
supported their position, actors turned to more assertive and aggressive strategies to convince the 
Ministry. The mistrust in the Ministry that they developed over the course of this negotiation 
process caused local actors to mobilise third parties and search contact with senior officials and 
even the Minister.   
The delay that resulted from this discussion eventually led local actors to search for a direct 
contact with DG Agri and to move the discussion from the national level to the European level. 
Although local actors did not succeed in getting approval for their interpretation of these rules, the 
meeting does open a window for finding a solution to the ongoing discussion on the application of 
these state aid requirements. By providing money for those project that are not subject to state aid 
requirement actors could start with the implementation of the LDP, while the Catalogue, although 
it set limits to the payments for farmer, allowed for a more flexible way of creating GS. An 
instrumental ‘bridging solution’ was eventually found.    
 
The processual institutional perspective that we have used in this article to describe this process 
has helped us to describe the process by which these rules are put into operation in a multi-level 
setting in which it self is largely constructed at the same time. A process perspective allows for 
incorporating the complexities and moving setting in which actors have to make sense of these 
rules, their interactions and relations, and in which the traditional authority of the state is no longer 
taken for granted.  
By being attentive to certain mechanisms we have tried to manage the complexity of this case and 
to acquire a better understanding of this process than what would have been possible by a mere 
description. By making use of the mechanism of escalation we have gained a deeper insight in 
how actors´ understandings and interpretations of the social setting in which they find them self 
and their interpretation of these rules influenced each other and eventually affected the 
establishment of GS.    
 
The case study further shows that a variety of processes take place at the same time and affect 
each other in this multi level setting. The outcome of the interactions between different actors at 
the local level, are the input for the discussion between the province of Gelderland and the 
Ministry, while the Ministry is affected by their interactions and experiences with DG Agri. For 
matters of space and time we focused largely on the interactions between local actors and the 
Ministry of ANF. It would be interesting however, to describe in more detail for example how 
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local actors somehow ‘cultivated’ their mistrust in the direction of the Ministry and to elaborate on 
how this process affected their interaction with the Ministry of ANF and vice versa. Treating the 
outcomes of these ‘other’ interactions as mere inputs may in fact reduce the complexity of the 
multi level setting in which these rules need to be complied with too much. Deciding on which 
processes should and should not be included and to what extant in a multi level case description is 
a difficult task.       
 
In the view of local actors and the initiators of this new governance arrangement, the multi level 
setting presents a complex network of different institutions and interdependent actors of which the 
authority and expertise is not always clear. The chains of mutual dependency among the actors at 
different levels can become so long and at times so unclear that stalemates can easily occur. Local 
actors remained extremely astonished that their public-private initiatives are part of a very 
complex world of multi-level governance. Persuading other actors to take a different stance or 
interpretation on these rules moreover, is difficult as actors point at agreements they have made 
with others. This multi level setting is full of different institutions that are touched upon by this 
new governance initiative. 
It is then creativity and the entrepreneurship of actors (Kingdon 1984) that can help to pass the 
obstacles by changing the existing institutions and the underlying power configuration (Haugaard 
and Lentner 2006; Goverde et alii 2004; Goverde et alii 2000; Clegg 1989) or by finding 
innovative ways to fit their initiative within this configuration. These strategies though may fail 
and bring with them the risk of further escalating a conflict and delaying the establishment of 
these new initiatives, without knowing whether this will eventually turn out in the benefit of the 
project. Local actors have to make the difficult choice of holding on to their own wishes or 
following that of others on which they partly depend for carrying out their initiatives.   
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